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Abstract
Although climate change jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well as future
people, current actions and ambitions to tackle it are inadequate. There are two prominent
explanations for this motivational gap in the climate ethics literature. The first maintains that
our conventional moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify a complex problem
such as climate change as an important moral problem. The second explanation refers to
people’s reluctance to change their behaviour and the temptation to shirk responsibility. We
argue that both factors are at play in the motivational gap and that they are complemented by
crucial moral psychological insights regarding moral disengagement, which enables emitters to
dissociate self-condemnation from harmful conduct. In this way, emitters are able to maintain
their profligate, consumptive lifestyle, even though this conflicts with their moral standards
with respect to climate change. We provide some illustrations of how strategies of moral
disengagement are deployed in climate change and discuss the relationship between the
explanations for the motivational gap and moral disengagement. On the basis of this explan-
atory framework, we submit that there are three pathways to tackle the motivational gap and
moral disengagement in climate change: making climate change more salient to emitters and
affirming their self-efficacy; reconsidering the self-interested motives that necessitate moral
disengagement; and tackling moral disengagement directly.
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1 Introduction
In its most recent Special Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
2018, 59) unambiguously states that total global warming has reached 1.0 °C, and that this
warming is entirely attributable to human activities. Already occurring and future predicted
impacts of climate change on human life include increased mortality, food and water insecu-
rity, the spread and exacerbation of diseases, conflicts resulting from resource scarcity, and
increased migration (IPCC 2014, 2018; Watts et al. 2018; WHO 2018). Climate change thus
jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well as future people, including their
rights to life, health, adequate food and water, adequate housing, and self-determination (Bell
2013; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009).
The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change reaffirms the essential goal of holding the
increase in global temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial temperature, while
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C (UN 2015, Article 2). However,
current policies, presently in place around the world, are still projected to result in about 3.3 °C
warming by the end of the century, and the combined pledges (expressed in the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions) under the Paris Agreement would still lead to a median
warming of 3.0 °C (Climate Action Tracker 2019b). According to the rating of Climate Action
Tracker (2019a), the pledges of most countries – including all developed countries – are
incompatible with the 2 °C-target. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP
2018, 21) calculates that emissions reductions that are roughly 2 to 3 times higher than current
pledges are needed to bridge the gap with 2 °C-pathways, and reductions 5 times higher are
necessary to align emissions with 1.5 °C-pathways.
Hence, there is a notable discrepancy between the severity of climate change’s impacts and
the current lack of motivation to adequately abate the threat, which can be called a motiva-
tional gap. A prominent explanation in the climate ethics literature maintains that the causes
for the lack of motivation to tackle climate change can be traced to the complexity of climate
change and the ineptitude of our moral judgement system to identify it as an important moral
problem (Jamieson 2006, 476–7; 2013, 39; 2014, 148–50; Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 243).
Jamieson (2010, 436–437) argues that climate change is not conceptualised as an urgent moral
problem because it does not present the characteristics of a paradigm moral problem: ‘climate
change is not a matter of a clearly identifiable individual acting intentionally so as to inflict and
identifiable harm on another identifiable individual, closely related in time and space.’ Another
common explanation holds that people’s motivation generated by their moral standards and
their sincere moral judgement is trumped by weakness of will and/or unwillingness to abide by
their moral judgement. They may resent the behavioural changes that are required to effec-
tively mitigate climate change (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001, 112), and are therefore tempted to
pass the buck onto future people, the poor and nature, rather than undertaking action
themselves (Gardiner 2011a, 45). Worth remembering in this context is the declaration of
former U.S. President George Bush Senior at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that
‘the American lifestyle is not up for negotiation’ (quoted in Singer 2002b, 2).
In this paper, we will argue that these two explanations are both at play in the
motivational gap and that they are complemented by crucial moral psychological
insights regarding moral disengagement. People’s conduct is kept in line with their
moral judgement by self-reactive influences: people ordinarily do things that give
them self-satisfaction, while refraining from behaving in ways that violate their moral
standards because it will bring self-condemnation (Bandura 1991, 69; 2016, 1).
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However, mechanisms of moral disengagement allow such self-regulation to be dis-
engaged from reprehensible conduct, by reconstructing one’s reprehensible conduct or
the moral issue at hand. The complexity of climate change and the ineptitude of our
moral judgement system to identify complex problems such as climate change as
important moral imperatives (emphasised by the first explanation of the motivational
gap) provides the necessary latitude for emitters to deploy mechanisms of moral
disengagement. The (self-)deceptive and biased reasoning embodied by mechanisms
of moral disengagement in turn facilitates a reconstruction of climate change and
one’s contribution to it, allowing people to continue emitting greenhouse gases, rather
than having to make fundamental lifestyle or policy changes to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions (emphasised by the second explanation of the motivational gap), without
feeling or being held accountable for the harmful effects of climate change. Moral
disengagement thus facilitates the motivational gap and allows it to persist by
reducing or removing the inconsistency that would otherwise arise between moral
judgement and self-interested conduct that conflicts with it.
We only focus on mitigating climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Success-
fully responding to climate change will also involve other mitigation strategies (such as sink
enhancement) as well as adaptation and compensation, yet these measures fall beyond the scope of
this paper. In our view, effectively reducing total greenhouse gas emissions will depend on
substantial actions undertaken by all actors (including international institutions, national and
regional governments, corporations, civil society organisations, and individuals) who have agency
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and to the extent that these actors have this kind of agency.
We will mainly focus on individual emitters and assume that they can be held accountable for their
profligate emissions.1 While individuals cannot be faulted for the greenhouse gases they emit in
order to meet their basic needs, andmany of their choices are determined by contextual factors that
are beyond their control (such as infrastructure, cultural expectations, and the energy regime)
(Gardiner 2011b, 46; Shue 2001, 451), we will hold that they can be held accountable for their
profligate emissions. More precisely, individual emitters do have at least some agency in climate
change mitigation, because they can reduce profligate or unnecessary emissions, for example by
decreasing their consumption of animal products,2 or their energy consumption by undertaking
fairly low-cost and easy actions (including motor vehicle maintenance, using public transportation,
switching from bathing to showering, and line drying of clothes) – the so-called low-hanging fruit
(Gardner and Stern 2008; Gilligan et al. 2010; Vandenbergh et al. 2008).3
1 According to Gardner and Stern (2008, 13) and Vandenbergh et al. (2008, 1703), individuals and households
account for 30–40% of total greenhouse gas emissions in the USA.
2 By now, it is well-known that the consumption of animal products via the livestock supply chain is an important
contributor to global warming: estimations range from 14.5% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions (Gerber
et al. 2013, 15) to 51% (Goodland and Anhang 2009, 11). Garnett (2009, 496–7) argues that in poor societies
with serious problems of mal- and undernutrition, keeping a goat, a pig, or a few chickens can make a critical
difference to the adequacy of people’s diet. It is fairly uncontroversial, however, that in many developed societies
(where adequately nutritional plant foods are sufficiently available), it is perfectly feasible for most people to
follow a diet low in animal products and still be well-nourished.
3 Shue (1993, 2001) famously distinguishes between subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. In general, we
are in agreement with Shue’s account, yet often the objection has been raised that this distinction involves an
important line-drawing problem. Since we do not have space here to fully do justice to this issue, we merely
assume that individual emitters can at least be held accountable for profligate or clearly unnecessary greenhouse
gas emissions for which feasible alternatives exist – emissions that would unambiguously classify as luxury
emissions.
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This paper makes a novel contribution to the debate about the motivational gap in climate
change in three significant respects. First, a few notable exceptions notwithstanding,4 the
deployment of moral disengagement remains underexplored in the climate ethics literature. In
order to contribute to filling this gap, in the following section, we will first briefly explain our
meta-ethical assumptions and how moral disengagement fits in, and then illustrate how some
mechanisms of moral disengagement are being deployed in climate change. Second, by
bringing climate ethics and moral psychology together, we aim to improve the understanding
of the motivational gap in climate change. Third, we explore how this explanatory framework
informs strategies to tackle moral disengagement and the motivational gap. We will work
towards the latter two aims in the third section, after which we will highlight the main points of
our discussion in the conclusion.
2 Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Climate Change
2.1 Meta-Ethics and Moral Disengagement
The connection between moral judgement and moral motivation is the subject of a long-standing
philosophical disagreement in meta-ethics. Although we cannot fully do justice to this intricate
debate here, some conceptual remarks might clarify our assumptions about the motivational force
of moral judgement and the role of moral disengagement in the motivational gap.
The first explanation of the motivational gap draws on the dominant understanding of moral
motivation in contemporary philosophy: according to internalism, a sincere moral judgement
necessarily entails motivation to abide by it (Buckwalter and Turri 2017, 434; Rosati 2016, 3.2).
From this perspective, the observation that many people fail to see climate change as an urgent
moral problem – and lack the motivation to address it – indicates that our moral judgement system
is inadequate to identify complexmoral problems such as climate change as urgent moral problems
and to instigate action (Jamieson 1992, 148; 2013, 39; 2014, 147; Markowitz and Shariff 2012).
Jamieson (2013, 44) indeed explicitly affirms the internalist view, which leads him to explain the
lack of motivation to act on climate change as a failure of our moral judgement system.
In contrast to Jamieson, Gardiner (2013, 102–103) is willing to take externalism seriously,
which holds that ‘agents might grasp the moral severity of a particular action perfectly well –
and so possess a justifying reason not to do it – and yet not be motivated accordingly.’ Indeed,
externalism can easily enough explain the lack of motivation to tackle climate change: one can
endorse the moral judgement that climate change poses a threat to human rights without being
motivated to act, simply because the connection between moral judgement and motivation is
purely contingent (Buckwalter and Turri 2017, 435; Rosati 2016, 3.2). The second explanation
of the motivational gap, according to which people act on their self-interested motives rather
than on motives generated by their moral standards, is easily supported by the externalist
account of moral motivation.
4 Some of the illustrations Bandura (2007, 2016, chapter 8) discusses to argue that selective moral disengagement
impedes ecological sustainability apply to climate change. Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) provide empirical
evidence of similar psychological processes in focus group research in Switzerland. Graça et al. (2014) provide
empirical evidence of how mechanisms of moral disengagement hinder the reduction of meat consumption.
Markowitz and Shariff (2012, 244) mention a guilty bias: to allay negative recriminations, individuals engage in
biased reasoning to minimize perceptions of their complicity. Peeters et al. (2015) provide an overview that
illustrates the deployment of all mechanisms of moral disengagement in climate change.
W. Peeters et al.
However, both positions remain unsatisfactory: we agree with Gardiner (2011b, 42) that
internalism as formulated above is controversial, but so is an externalist rejection of the
conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. We would therefore argue
that there is an alternative possibility: within internalism, an important distinction can be made
between strong internalism and weak internalism. Both views hold that a sincere moral
judgement necessarily entails motivating reasons for action, but the distinction lies in whether
this moral motivation overridinglymotivates people to comply with their moral judgement. On
the strong version of internalism, a person who makes a sincere moral judgement will be
overridingly motivated by her judgement (Rosati 2016, 3.2). However, this assumption is
overly strong, and contemporary moral philosophers commonly accept some form of weak
internalism, which holds that even though the person who makes a sincere moral judgement
will necessarily feel some motivation to act accordingly, this moral motivation can be
overridden (Buckwalter and Turri 2017, 434–435; Rosati 2016, 3.2). First, the motivation to
comply with one moral principle may be overridden by the motivation to comply with another
moral principle. This refers to the much broader problem of conflict between moral principles,
which falls beyond the scope of this paper. Hare (1981, 57–62) subsumes two further instances
of moral motivation being overridden under the heading of ‘taking a moral holiday’: on the
one hand, the motivation to abide by one’s moral judgement may be defeated by weakness of
will and other mental maladies; and on the other hand, competing, self-interested desires may
entail motivation to act which is stronger than the motivation entailed by one’s sincere moral
judgement (also see Rosati 2016, 3.2).
In the case of climate change, however, we would submit that it is often unclear whether the
motivation to abide by one’s moral judgement is thwarted by weakness of will or by
motivation stemming from self-interested desires. Moreover, to some extent, acting on self-
interested desires rather than abiding by one’s sincere moral judgement is predicated on
weakness of will, since strong-willed people will not so easily allow their moral motivation
to be overridden by self-interested motives. Consider again the two instances of profligate
emissions mentioned in the introduction above, which we believe that individuals could easily
reduce. First, it is often unclear whether people’s motivation to continue consuming animal
products (when sufficient adequate alternatives are available) in the face of climate change
arises from an akratic attitude (given by habitual consumption, or lack of time to explore
alternatives) or self-interested desires (an unwillingness to reduce the consumption of animal
products due to, for example, a strong preference for meat or an aversion to vegetarian or
vegan lifestyles). Second, regarding profligate energy consumption, we similarly believe that
both weakness of will (for example related to habits or the perceived demandingness of
behavioural changes) and self-interested motives (such as comfort) lie at the basis of people’s
inaction regarding the low-hanging fruit.
Hence, weak internalism seems to give a more nuanced account of moral motivation: in
contrast to externalism, it does not rely on a controversial rejection of the assumption that a
sincere moral judgement necessarily entails at least some motivation to abide by it, but in
contrast to strong internalism, weak internalism accepts that such moral motivation can be
overridden. Nonetheless, it does not readily explain how moral motivation is thwarted by
weakness of will and/or motivation stemming from self-interested desires, or how the resulting
inconsistency between moral judgment and conduct that goes against it is managed. It is here
that our main interest for this paper lies and we consider insights from moral psychology, and
especially Bandura’s work on moral agency and moral disengagement, to be highly significant
in explaining these processes.
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Indeed, according to Bandura (2016, 1), a full understanding of morality ‘must explain not
only how people come to behave morally, but also how they can behave inhumanely and still
retain their self-respect and feel good about themselves.’ Moral conduct is motivated and
regulated by the on-going exercise of self-reactive influence: behaving in accordance with
personal and societal moral standards is supported by positive self-sanctions (including self-
respect and rewarding oneself), whereas violating one’s moral standards would result in
negative self-sanctions (such as feelings of guilt or remorse and self-punishment) (Bandura
2002, 102; 2016, 1, 29). Hence, by deploying these self-sanctions, it is this self-regulatory
system that links moral reasoning to moral action (Bandura 2002, 101–102) and thus provides
the motivation to comply with one’s moral judgement.
However, these self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and
there are many psycho-social manoeuvres by which moral self-sanctions can be disengaged
from reprehensible conduct (Bandura 2002, 102; 2016, 2). The goal of these mechanisms of
moral disengagement is to – consciously or unconsciously – convince oneself and others that
one’s reprehensible conduct still falls within moral standards through changing the perception
of one’s actions or reconstructing the situation. In other words, moral disengagement enables
people to compromise their moral standards and to engage in unethical behaviour, while
retaining their sense of moral integrity and not having to face self-condemnation or social
disapproval (Bandura 1991, 71–72; 2016, 2). Moral disengagement allows people to rational-
ise their reprehensible behaviour, and thus permits weakness of will and/or self-interested
desires to thwart their moral motivation to abide by their moral judgement. A substantial body
of evidence has indeed demonstrated the disinhibitory power of moral disengagement (see for
example Bandura 2016; Bandura et al. 2001; Barsky 2011; Bersoff 1999; Bustamante and
Chaux 2014; Graça et al. 2014; Kish-Gephart et al. 2013; Paciello et al. 2013).5
At this point it is worth mentioning that Gardiner (2011a, chapter 9) influentially discusses
a similar phenomenon, which he calls moral corruption. According to him, people face strong
temptation to pass the buck of climate change onto the poor, the future and nature, but they are
reluctant to face up to moral criticism for succumbing to it and they are therefore likely to be
attracted to weak or deceptive arguments that appear on the surface to license the buck-
passing. Gardiner (2011a, 301–302) argues further that even if people accept that climate
change poses a serious moral challenge, our resolve to tackle it is threatened by ‘corruption
that targets our ways of talking and thinking, and so prevents us from even seeing the problem
in the right way.’ He then goes on to illustrate this phenomenon of moral corruption by
drawing parallels with the Dashwoods’ self-serving reasoning in Jane Austen’s Sense and
Sensibility (Gardiner 2011a, chapter 9). His examples are different from those we discuss
below, but it should be clear that our analysis of moral disengagement confirms Gardiner’s
diagnosis and complements his account of moral corruption by drawing on significant insights
from moral psychology.
5 Referring to Barnes (1985), Singer (2002a, 70–72) mentions conditioned ethical blindness, which might be
taken to relate to moral disengagement as well. Barnes (1985, 160) illustrates this concept with reference to the
discrepancy he experienced between on the one hand using animals in research (and being rewarded for this
without questioning the morality involved) and consuming meat as food, while on the other hand being kind to
his pets and tending to sick animals. Although discussing the conditioning by professional rewards falls beyond
the scope of this paper, it is useful to point out that the compartmentalisation and dubious justification described
by Barnes substantially overlaps with moral disengagement.
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An important insight shared between Gardiner’s account of moral corruption and our
illustrations of how moral disengagement is deployed in climate change is the following issue.
He mentions that the problem involved in moral corruption
‘is not quite that the values or arguments are bad or mistaken considered simply as such;
instead, they would be good values and correct arguments in a more limited context, but
are misappropriated or badly applied.… If one can twist or pervert otherwise plausible
moral claims to a corrupt end, then one can both hoodwink some into thinking that they
do right when they do wrong, and also provide moral cover for the more discerning.’
(Gardiner 2011a, 307-308).
Similarly, as we will illustrate in the following subsections, strategies of moral disengagement
typically invoke arguments that are not entirely invalid or manifestly misguided, but the
application of these arguments to exonerate emitters from accountability for the effects of
their profligate emissions is deceitful and unjustified.
We are convinced that all mechanisms of moral disengagement discussed by Bandura and
other moral psychologists are deployed in climate change, but we only have space here to
discuss some of them that are used pervasively in the public discourse as illustrations, namely
discrediting evidence of harm, advantageous comparison, diffusion of responsibility, and
displacement of responsibility.
2.2 Discrediting Evidence of Harm
Climate change and its effects have frequently been subject to outright denial – for example by
Donald Trump, who has dismissed global warming as a Chinese hoax6 – even in the face of
overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary. European politicians who deny climate
change include prominent British Conservative politicians Michael Gove and Nigel Lawson
(Ward 2016), and former French President Nicholas Sarkozy (Dagorn 2016). Also consider
that the oil industry, the political right in the USA, conservative think tanks, and a network of
doubt-mongers have played a pivotal role in the dissemination of unscientific claims and
unfounded scepticism about global warming, which have led to an informational bias towards
scepticism and denial in much of the United States’ mainstream media (Oreskes and Conway
2010, chapter 6).
Indeed, there appears to be a significant gap between the actual scientific consensus and the
public perception thereof. Cook et al. (2016) report that over 97% of climate scientists in the
peer-reviewed scientific literature endorse the consensus on anthropogenic global warming,
while the number of papers rejecting it is a minuscule proportion of the published research. In
contrast, in June 2016, only a minority (27%) of Americans believed that almost all scientists
agree that climate change is caused by human activity, another 35% said that more than half of
climate scientists agree about this, 20% believed that fewer than half of scientists agree on the
anthropogenic causes of climate change, and 15% of Americans said that almost no scientific
experts believe that human behaviour is the main contributing factor in climate change (Funk
and Kennedy 2016).
In fact, it can be argued that there is a disproportionate focus on scientific uncertainty and
disagreement in climate change, while much of it is manufactured or grossly exaggerated in
6 See https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en.
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order to create the false impression that some conclusions are much less widely accepted by
scientists than they actually are (Vanderheiden 2008, 197). Despite overwhelming evidence to
the contrary, doubt and controversy are created in order to discredit the evidence of the harm
emitters are causing, which facilitates the evasion of accountability: ‘as long as the harmful
results of one’s conduct are ignored, minimised, or the evidence is discredited, there is little
reason for self-censure to be activated’ (Bandura 2007, 21). Moreover, in addition to clearly
being unrealistic, demanding full scientific certainty merely serves as a convenient justification
for inaction or postponed action (Bandura 2007, 21; Gifford 2011, 292) – even though in the
face of the possibly catastrophic impacts of climate change, inaction is a dangerous way of
dealing with any remaining uncertainty. Rather, as the UNFCCC clearly states, ‘the Parties
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures …’ (UN 1992, article 3, emphasis added).
In sum, although some scientific uncertainties remain and clearly complicate matters, they
do not impede a general normative evaluation of the causes of climate change and the threats it
poses to the enjoyment of human rights. Rather, discrediting evidence of harm is a mechanism
of moral disengagement used to evade blame for the causal contribution of one’s greenhouse
gas emissions to the harmful impacts of climatic changes.
2.3 Advantageous Comparison
People often consider their greenhouse gas emissions to be a by-product of their ordinary,
everyday activities. Indeed, Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, 290, emphasis added) states that indi-
viduals should not be held accountable for harms ‘by calling their acts causes of harms when
their acts are not at all unusual, assuming that they did not intend the harm.’ He discusses the
example of recreational driving in a fuel-intensive car and concludes: ‘it is not unusual to go
for joyrides. Such drivers do not intend any harm. Hence, we should not see my act of driving
on a sunny Sunday afternoon as a cause of global warming or its harms’ (Sinnott-Armstrong
2005, p. 290).
Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, 290) argues that condemnation should be reserved for the worst
offenders, because if agents who are doing no worse than average are condemned, then the
worst offenders would have no incentive to improve their acts, because even should they
reduce their activities to average levels, they could still expect to remain subject to blame
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 290). However, we consider this argumentation to be flawed. First,
although many greenhouse gas emitting activities ostensibly seem usual in the local context of
developed countries, they are unusual in a global context. Worldwide data about outings in a
fuel-intensive car are lacking, but consider for example meat consumption. In 2013, an average
of 70 and 115 kg of meat was consumed per capita in Belgium, respectively the USA, while
the world average was merely 43 kg (FAO 2018). Although eating large quantities of meat
does not appear to be unusual in the context of Belgium or the USA, it is rather unusual in a
global context. Since climate change is a global problem, greenhouse gas emitting acts should
be scrutinized with reference to the global context, rather than a specific geographical or
economic background. Meat consumers in Belgium and the USA should effectively be held
accountable according to Sinnott-Armstrong’s own heuristic – contrary to his argument –
because they are among the worst offenders in the global context. Second, and more impor-
tantly, even if greenhouse gas emitting activities were usual in the global context, this would
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still not exonerate emitters from responsibility, because it would be an instance of the ad
populum fallacy. The mere fact that many other people engage in an act does not render it
harmless. In other words, the mere usualness of a greenhouse gas emitting activity is an
inadequate basis to conclude that it is morally permissible.
We do not deny that part of the challenge climate change poses to our moral judgement
system is indeed that greenhouse gases are emitted by seemingly ordinary, everyday activities.
However, we believe that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument corresponds to the mechanism of
moral disengagement called advantageous comparison. People routinely compare their actions
with those of others, and derive subjective and descriptive norms from their observations about
what the proper course of action is (Gifford 2011, 294). The perception of behaviour is
coloured by what it is compared against, and by exploiting this contrast principle, reprehen-
sible conduct can be made to seem righteous (Bandura 1991, 80; 2002, 105). Invoking the
usualness of greenhouse gas emitting activities would render each greenhouse gas emitting
activity self-excusing if, and merely because, it is sufficiently common. Moreover, Sinnott-
Armstrong’s (2005) pragmatic heuristic to only blame the worst offenders unmistakably
encourages the search for and comparison with people who emit more greenhouse gases,
which would allegedly exculpate one’s own purportedly usual emissions.
Hence, rather than convincingly exonerating emitters’ culpability, reference to the usualness
of their greenhouse gas emitting activities amounts to a mere rationalization.
2.4 Diffusion of Responsibility
Climate change is a collective action problem, in which at least according to some authors
(including Cripps 2013, 119–124; Johnson 2003, 273; Sandler 2010, 168; Sinnott-Armstrong
2005, 289) an individual’s greenhouse gas emissions appear entirely faultless, since, taken
separately, their effects are insignificant. The greenhouse gases of any particular individual
make no observable contribution to global warming, which seems to lead to the conclusions
that (i) there is nothing morally wrong with individuals emitting greenhouse gases, because
they do not cause any harms; and (ii) that individuals cannot make a difference by undertaking
individual actions to reduce their emissions. Gifford and Comeau (2011, 1305) indeed find that
47% of respondents cited ‘lack of perceived behavioral control’ when asked why they did not
do something about climate change.
However, this view is problematic. Hiller (2011, 352–3) convincingly argues that individual
greenhouse gas emitting activities are at least prima facie wrong because the expected amount
of harm is greater than not emitting: there will be a positive expected net increase in the
amount of climate change. Due to the complexity of the causal processes underlying climate
change, it is of course impossible to trace back a particular harm resulting from climatic
changes to a particular greenhouse gas molecule emitted by a particular agent, yet it is clear
that even an individual’s emissions provide a fully real – albeit infinitesimal – contribution to
global warming.
To this perspective on individual emitters’ contribution to climate change, two important
objections can be raised, neatly summarised by Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, 289, emphasis
added): ‘global warming will not occur unless lots of other people also expel greenhouse
gases. So my individual act [i.e. an outing in a fuel-intensive car] is neither necessary nor
sufficient for global warming.’ Hence, it is first claimed that climate change is a matter of
overdetermined positive causation: climate change will occur, whether or not individual X
emits greenhouse gases. Second, the claim that individual X’s emissions are insufficient to
Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap in Climate Change
cause climate change assumes that emissions cause harm only after their accumulation in the
atmosphere exceeds a certain threshold.
Our responses to these objections start from the observation that climate change is already
occurring, resulting in significant harmful impacts, and additional emissions of greenhouse
gases cause further detrimental climatic changes. Hence, the question is not whether climate
change will occur, but rather how much climate change will occur.7 Against the first charge
that X’s emissions are not necessary to cause climate change, we argue that climate change
indeed occurs without X’s greenhouse gas emissions, yet that these emissions nonetheless
further exacerbate climate change in an infinitesimal but fully real way. Against the second
objection that X’s emissions are not sufficient to cause climate change, we should like to point
out that there are indeed a number of thresholds related to climate change, which, once
crossed, may lead to an abrupt worsening of climate change, yet even below such thresholds,
climate change already has significant harmful impacts, and X’s emissions again contribute to
these impacts in a fully real – albeit infinitesimal – way. Relative to preindustrial levels, global
warming has reached 1.0 °C in 2017 (IPCC 2018, 59), which has already led to significant
climatic changes adversely impacting human life, and any additional emissions of greenhouse
gases cause further detrimental climatic changes. Moreover, the IPCC (2018, 186–212) has
observed trends in the intensity and frequency of some temperature and weather extremes
since the mid-twentieth century as a result of only 0.5 °C of global warming. In this light,
rather than considering individuals’ emissions to be morally insignificant, their contribution to
the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to the resulting climate-related
harms is fully real.
Undeniably, part of the complexity of climate change is that the greenhouse gas emissions
of a large number of individuals and other agents contribute to it. However, we should also
resist the temptation to try to exonerate individuals emitters’ culpability by construing the
contribution of their greenhouse gases to the problem as morally insignificant, because it
amounts to a well-known strategy of moral disengagement: in problems of collective action, an
individual’s contribution to an aggregate harmful effect seems trivial and any harm done by a
group of people can always largely be ascribed to the behaviour of the others in the group
(Bandura 1991, 85). In this way, the exercise of moral self-control is weakened, because
personal agency is obscured by diffusing responsibility for detrimental behaviour (Bandura
2002, 107; 2007, 19).
This mechanism and the problem of collective action are rather familiar in issues of global
justice: as observed by Shue (1996, 112–13), the complexity involved in many systemic
deprivations feeds the temptation to reason that, since they are the responsibility of practically
everyone, ‘they are the responsibility of no one in particular, least of all oneself. No one needs
to change until after everyone else changes, it seems.’ Similarly, Miller (2008, 120) notes that
if we leave the collective duty to tackle climate change undistributed, ‘we fall into the familiar
trap whereby no particular person or group of persons has a defined obligation, and each can
excuse him- or herself from taking steps to combat climate change by passing the responsi-
bility to someone else.’
7 Another line of argumentation in the debate holds that treating the emissions of an individual as entirely
faultless involves at least two mistakes in moral mathematics as described by Parfit (1987, 70–83): ignoring the
effects of sets of acts and ignoring imperceptible effects (see e.g. Schwenkenbecher 2014; Vanderheiden 2008,
160–167). Reconstructing this debate falls beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to point out that these
sophisticated objections against the view that individual emission are entirely faultless are complementary to our
more practical ones.
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Although the mechanism of diffusing responsibility is most obvious at the individual level,
it also explains the inertia at the international level in the context of the UNFCCC: a large
number of disparate parties all have to cooperate to come to a comprehensive agreement
containing robust and often costly measures to tackle climate change (Harris 2007). In this
context, it is tempting to minimise the contribution of one’s own country to the problem and
emphasise other countries’ contributions. Consider for example that an important argument for
then-US President George W. Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Accord was that it did not set any
standards for developing countries such as China and India (Sanger 2001). Similarly, in his
speech announcing the USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, President Donald Trump
stated that in comparison with China and India, the Paris Agreement is unfair to the USA
(Trump 2017, paragraphs 10–14).
In sum, even though climate change is a collective action problem, this does not exonerate
individuals: individual emitters can and should be held accountable for the fully real contri-
bution of their profligate emissions to the problem.
2.5 Displacement of Responsibility
Climate change is a collective action problem, and in general, the establishment or improve-
ment of collective institutions is taken to be the best solution to collective action problems.
Indeed, citizens – rightfully – expect guidance of their national governments regarding
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and those governments as well as international
institutions can and should be blamed for their lack of ambition. Klein (2014, 212) considers
‘the idea that change is something that is handed down from above by our betters, rather than
something we demand ourselves’ to be one of the greatest psychological barriers to climate
action. However, this cannot justify complacency: if our argument in the previous section is
sound and an individual’s emissions indeed provide a fully real – albeit infinitesimal –
contribution to global warming, then this implies that even in the absence of effective
(trans)national policies to tackle climate change, individual emitters retain culpability for the
effects of the emissions that are a result of their profligate lifestyle. Moreover, it would be too
simplistic to relegate all responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to the collective
level, because ‘what states do must be carried out ultimately by individuals’ (Lichtenberg
2014, 9). In addition, individual reductions of greenhouse gas emissions may actually signal
support for environmental policies to the collective (policy) level: for example, if more people
cycle, politicians would be more inclined to invest in cycling infrastructure (which, in turn, is
likely to lead to more people cycling).
Hence, the need for collective measures to tackle climate change does not let individuals off
the hook.8 Relegating all duties to tackle climate change to the collective level in order to
attempt to exonerate individual emitters from accountability for the effects of their profligate
emissions amounts to moral disengagement through displacing responsibility: they are seem-
ingly spared self-condemnation for the harmful effects of climate because they do not perceive
themselves to be responsible for their greenhouse-gas emitting activities (Bandura 1991, 81;
2002, 106).
8 Moreover, if an individual emitter wants to invoke the argument that it is the task of the government and
supranational institutions to address climate change, she at the very least has the obligation to vote for parties that
represent the most likely chance of success to see such policies effectively implemented (De Smet et al. 2016;
Maltais 2013, 602).
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Also note that displacement of responsibility in climate change does not only occur in the
relationship between individual emitters and collective institutions, but also in other ways. For
example, individual consumers often contend that companies should improve their production
processes and, vice versa, companies shift blame to consumers, arguing that they primarily
want products at low prices. Individual emitters may also blame all other individual emitters,
and could find some ammunition in the argument regarding positive causal overdetermination
discussed in the previous subsection. However, as we have seen, this argument fails because
every individual’s emissions exacerbate climate change in an infinitesimal but fully real way.9
Also consider that politicians often try to justify inaction by arguing that their electorate
opposes more robust climate policy measures.
As we stated in the introduction, we believe that climate change is so great a challenge that
effectively addressing it will depend on substantial actions undertaken by all actors who have
agency in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and to the extent that these actors have this kind
of agency. Hence, even though it is correct to point out the responsibilities of other agents (for
example, collective institutions), such argument cannot be employed to exonerate the culpa-
bility of any particular agent (such as individual emitter X), because this would amount to
moral disengagement.
3 Addressing Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap
There is no silver bullet to tackle the motivational gap; increasing ambitions of individual
emitters and other agents for addressing climate change will require a multi-strategic approach.
This approach will have to include addressing moral disengagement, since it is a significant
factor in the motivational gap. We agree with Bandura (2007, 32), when he concludes that ‘if
we are to be responsible stewards of our environment for future generations, we must make it
difficult to disengage moral sanctions from ecologically destructive practices.’ Unfortunately,
in contrast to the vast body of research providing conceptual analysis and empirical evidence
of moral disengagement, relatively little research has explored interventions to tackle it
(Bustamante and Chaux 2014, 55, 59; Moore 2015, 202). In this section, our aim is therefore
twofold: we will elucidate how moral disengagement relates to the explanations of the
motivational gap offered in the climate ethics literature in order to provide a comprehensive
explanatory framework for the motivational gap, and explore how this informs strategies for
reducing moral disengagement in climate change.
3.1 Moral Disengagement and the Complexity of Climate Change
The first explanation for the motivational gap maintains that our moral judgement system is
not well-equipped to identify climate change as an important moral imperative or morally
intense issue (Jamieson 2006, 476–7; 2010, 436–7; Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 243). As
mentioned in the introduction, Jamieson (2010, 436–438; 2014, 168–169) argues that people
9 Jamieson (2014, 171–173) argues that climate change will occur whether or not an emitter X needlessly or
thoughtlessly engages in greenhouse-gas emitting activities. For virtually every emitter X, he maintains, there is a
group which does not include X such that if it were to act differently, then climate change would not occur. Even
though we agree that climate change is already happening, whether or not X engages in further greenhouse-gas
emitting activities, this argument fails to take into account that even then, X’s emissions contribute to further
worsening climate change.
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do not tend to conceptualize climate change as an urgent moral problem because it is not
accompanied by the characteristics of a paradigm moral problem: the harmful effects of
climate change are not easily identifiable, they are not the result of intentional acts, and victim
and perpetrator are not closely related in time and space. He therefore concludes that viewing
climate change as a problem of individual moral responsibility requires a revision of our
everyday understandings of individual responsibility.
We fully agree that the inherent complexity of climate change – including the remaining
scientific uncertainties, the fact that greenhouse gas emissions are the by-product of seemingly
ordinary, usual activities, and the need for collective action of a large number of diverse agents
– poses a challenge to our moral judgement system. However, this explanation of the
motivational gap does not take into account people’s ability to psychologically reconstruct a
situation in order to reduce its moral intensity (Barsky 2011, 61), or, in other words, to
disengage moral self-sanctions from their harmful conduct (in this case, greenhouse gas
emitting activities) (see also Bandura 1991, 81–2). It should be noted, first, that these otherwise
plausible claims about the complexity of climate change are also invoked to exonerate
individual emitters from their accountability for the effects of their profligate emissions, but
that this particular application of these arguments is unjustified and deceitful (see also Bersoff
1999, 37). As Gardiner, 2011a, b, 307) argues with respect to his diagnosis of moral corruption
in climate change, rather than being entirely mistaken, the problem is that these arguments are
misappropriated to serve corrupt ends. Second, Bersoff (1999, 37) notes that ‘the less moral
ambiguity there is surrounding a situation, the less latitude an agent has in negotiating reality in
such a way as to provide justification for an unethical action.’ The inherent complexity of
climate change precisely provides the necessary ambiguity and latitude for emitters to
reconstruct the problem of climate change and their contribution to it. Gardiner (2011a, 46,
emphasis in original) indeed confirms that ‘since climate change involves a complex conver-
gence of problems, it is easy to engage in manipulative or self-deceptive behavior’ – which
amounts to moral disengagement.
Consider for example that the causes and effects of climate change are dispersed in space
and time, in the sense that greenhouse gases emitted from any geographical location affect the
climate globally and into the future (Gardiner 2011a, 23; Jamieson 2014, 102). This obviously
creates a significant amount of ambiguity, complicating sound moral judgements about
causality and the culpability of individual emitters. However, the literature and the general
audience appear to take this argument a step further and often perceive the causes and effects
of climate change as remote in space and time. For example, Markowitz and Shariff (2012,
244) and Leiserowitz (2006, 50) note that many people in developed nations believe that
climate change will most negatively affect individuals who live in faraway places, or far in the
future, or both. However, whereas the dispersal of causes and effects means that greenhouse
gases emitted anywhere and anytime affect the climate globally and into the future, the spatial
and temporal remoteness is an inaccurate depiction of climate change: concerns about vulner-
ability to the harmful impacts of climate change do not apply only to people who live remote in
space or time (Gardiner 2011b, 45; Jamieson 2010, 439).
First, although future people will likely suffer most, climate change’s harmful impacts are
already massively affecting human life today. The IPCC (2014, 49) states that ‘in recent
decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all
continents and across the oceans.’ Watts et al. (2018, 585–595) report already observable
health impacts related to climate change, including a 46% increase in the frequency of
weather-related disasters between 1990 and 1999 and 2007–2016, a massive increase in
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dengue virus transmission and related morbidity and mortality, and significant agricultural
yield losses (especially in regions with high vulnerability to undernutrition).
Second, climate change not only affects people living in distant places, but also in the
developed world. For example, climate change is already contributing to the burden of disease
and premature deaths in Europe, mainly by increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events (especially heat waves), changes in the distribution of climate-sensitive
diseases, and changes in environmental and social conditions (EEA 2017, 199–222). In the
USA, the amount of precipitation falling in very heavy events has markedly increased from
1958 to 2012, for example by 71% in the Northeast (Melillo et al. 2014, 37).
Hence, although the dispersion of causes and effects of climate change contributes to its
complexity, emphasis on the spatial and temporal remoteness of its harmful effects turns out to
be a deceitful characterization of climate change that facilitates moral disengagement. As
Bandura (2016, 64) observes, ‘it is easier to harm others when their suffering is not visible and
when destructive actions are physically and temporally remote from their effects.’
We will discuss two main pathways to address these issues in order to increase people’s
moral motivation to contribute to combatting climate change: first, making climate change and
its negative effects more salient to individual emitters; and second, increasing people’s
perception of self-efficacy.
The first strategy consists of reducing climate change’s complexity by making it more
salient and more personally relevant to individual emitters. Moser and Dilling (2006, 503) and
Weber (2015, 562–563) point out that since the perceived immediacy and personal relevance
of threats play a large role in the willingness to take action, connecting climate change to
individual emitters is likely to increase their motivation to act on climate change. Therefore,
communicators should address the inaccurate perception of climate change’s impacts as
remote in space and time, and highlight that climate change is already affecting people living
here and now (Leiserowitz 2006, 53–55; Moser and Dilling 2006, 500). Leiserowitz (2006,
55–56) argues that articulating and emphasising the projected impacts on human health in
particular is likely to elevate public concerns about climate change. Empirical studies by Kish-
Gephart et al. (2013) indeed find that making the harm to others salient can reduce the
likelihood that people will morally disengage, because humans have developed a natural
tendency to automatically recognize and respond empathetically when others are being
harmed. Similarly, Paciello et al. (2013, 6) find that ‘the more participants were concerned
about others in need the less they relied upon cognitive maneuvering that obscured their
personal responsibility.’
In contrast, overly dire messages and inducing fear, anxiety or personal distress about
climate change might backfire by evoking counterproductive responses, including moral
disengagement (Fida et al. 2016, 5; Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 245; Moore 2015, 200;
Moser and Dilling 2006, 496; Paciello et al. 2013, 6–7). Therefore, rather than appealing to
fear and anxiety to communicate urgency, communicators should tap into the desire of people
to not just be part of the problem, but part of the solution: ‘people want to know what they can
do, that they are able to do it, and that others are doing their share as well’ (Moser and Dilling
2006, 505).
The second pathway to increase the moral motivation of individual emitters is therefore to
point out that they do have agency in tackling climate change and show them what to do and
how to do it. Communicators could emphasise that individuals’ emissions are a fully real
contribution to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to the resulting
climate-related harms (see section 2.4 above), rather than being insignificant. In this way, the
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savings potential of reducing meat and dairy consumption, and of actions that reduce energy
consumption – the so-called low-hanging fruit (including motor vehicle maintenance,
showering instead of bathing, and line drying of clothes) – could be highlighted.
However, Moser and Dilling (2006, 505) argue that merely identifying possible actions will
be inadequate for all but the most motivated and committed people: ‘for most individuals, what
is required to actually implement these actions is empowerment through a sense of self-
efficacy …, social support or peer pressure … or modelling by others….’ We would submit
that especially empowerment through self-efficacy should be pursued, because it impedes
moral disengagement. According to Bandura (2016, 5) and Bandura et al. (2001, 125),
perceived self-efficacy is the foundation of human aspirations, motivation, well-being, and
personal accomplishments. It plays a pivotal role in the process of self-management because it
affects actions directly: people who do not believe that they can produce desired effects by
their actions (low perceived self-efficacy) have little incentive to act or to persevere in the face
of difficulties. A strong sense of self-efficacy, in contrast, affects behaviour in large part ‘by
promoting prosocialness, curtailing the propensity to disengage moral self-sanctions from
socially alienating and harmful conduct, and countering ruminative and vengeful affectivity’
(Bandura et al. 2001, 125). Hence, perceived self-efficacy not only leads people to engage to a
lesser extent in transgressive conduct, but also makes moral disengagement less accessible
(Fida et al. 2016, 14).
The magnitude and complexity of climate change clearly overwhelm us, very much
reducing people’s feelings of self-efficacy and perceived behavioural control (see also
section 2.4 above). Increasing people’s perception of agency and self-efficacy will thus be
crucial to addressing the motivational gap and tackling moral disengagement. Essential to this
will be countering the perception that individual actions do not make a difference, and, in
contrast, emphasising that every individual contribution counts (see also Cismaru et al. 2011,
80). As Jamieson (2006, 481–482) eloquently puts this:
We must begin from where we are – changing ourselves, changing our leaders, and
changing our institutions – but from here we can change the world. Biking instead of
driving or choosing the veggieburger rather than the hamburger may seem like small
choices, and it may seem that such small choices by such little people barely matter. But
ironically, they may be the only thing that matters. For large changes are caused and
constituted by small choices. And in the end, however things turn out, it is how we live
that gives meaning and significance to our lives.
In addition, Cismaru et al. (2011, 80–81) recommend increasing people’s perception of self-
efficacy by providing them with reasons to believe that they can adopt recommendations for
action and success stories from others, connecting climate change with other priority issues,
and decreasing the perceived costs by making it easier for people to implement the recom-
mendations for action and proposing a step-by-step plan from easy-to-follow to more costly
actions.
In sum, according to one explanation in the climate ethics literature for the motivational
gap, the complexity inherent to climate change prevents us from identifying it as an important
moral imperative, and leads individual emitters to believe that their individual contributions are
insignificant. However, this complexity also facilitates moral disengagement by providing the
necessary latitude to reconstruct the problem and one’s contribution to it. We suggest tackling
these problems by making climate change and its harmful impacts more salient to people, as
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well as by increasing people’s perception of self-efficacy with respect to climate change
mitigation.
3.2 Moral Disengagement and Akratic or Self-Interested Motives
Gardiner (2011a, 31) and Jamieson (1992, 147) argue that action on climate change raises
fundamental and uncomfortable questions about who we are, what we want to be and what
kinds of societies we want. By selectively disengaging the self-regulatory system, moral
disengagement allows one to dodge these questions, and to maintain a consumptive lifestyle
high in greenhouse gas emissions without feeling or being held accountable for its harmful
effects.
There is a disjunction between the need to mitigate climate change and the personal
preference for a particular, materialistic lifestyle high in greenhouse gas emissions: people
may feel anxiety over climate change, but resent the changes in behaviour that are required to
effectively mitigate climate change (such as using public transportation or reducing energy and
meat consumption) (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001, 99). Similarly, Graça et al. (2014) find that
mechanisms of moral disengagement play a significant role in resolving the inconsistency
between people’s concern for environmental sustainability, animal welfare, and health on the
one hand, and cherished food practices high in meat consumption on the other hand.
Consistent with the theory of moral disengagement, these rationalisations defuse feelings of
guilt and self-censure, and are associated with the lack of willingness to consider transitioning
toward less harmful dietary choices (Graça et al. 2014, 761). In general, the opportunity costs
involved in shifting away from consumptive lifestyles high in greenhouse gas emissions are
perceived as daunting (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001, 107; Klein 2014, 212) and moral disen-
gagement allows emitters to avoid this shift without feeling or being held accountable for the
resulting climate-related harms.
In order to address the motivational gap, we should therefore try to reconceptualise human
flourishing, away from materialism and a lifestyle high in greenhouse gas emissions, and
towards a direct focus on quality of life. The apparent trade-off between acting pro-
environmentally and pursuing well-being can be reduced by showing that beyond the point
of ensuring the material preconditions for subsistence, material wealth has relatively little
relationship to wellbeing (Brown and Kasser 2005, 349–350; Jackson 2009, 15, 143; Kasser
2002, 4). This holds the promise that by consuming less, we could not only contribute to
tackling climate change, but also live better (Jackson 2005, 25). There are two sides to this
coin, both of which may motivate people to move away from materialism and a lifestyle high
in greenhouse gas emissions: first, consuming less will reduce the negative consequences of
consumerism for personal and collective wellbeing; and second, consuming less will open up
the possibility to pursue important non-material aspects of wellbeing.
First, materialism may have become the prevailing model of the good life, but it has also
generated significant costs to personal and collective wellbeing: in addition to contributing to
climate change, negative effects include noise, pollution, consumer anxiety, stench, work
stress, and health risks (Soper 2007, 211, 221). Kasser (2002, chapter 2) provides empirical
evidence underpinning the conclusion that strong materialistic values are associated with a
pervasive undermining of people’s personal well-being (including low life satisfaction, de-
pression and anxiety, physical problems, and personality disorders). Communicators should
draw more attention to these negative consequences of materialistic pursuits in order to
motivate individual and societal change.
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Second, it should be emphasised that important pleasures and sources of gratification, such
as leisure activities, interpersonal relationships, and cultural and political participation, are
being lost, remain unrealized, or are thwarted by materialistic pursuits (Jackson 2009, 100–
102; Kasser 2002, 72). Kasser (2002, chapter 7) also argues that rather than providing paths to
freedom and autonomy, people feel chained and controlled when they focus on materialistic
values. The most important sources of life satisfaction (including peace, freedom, community
involvement, employment, recognition, personal growth, relationships and self-respect) are
non-material in nature and rely only to a limited extent on the emission of greenhouse gases
(Brown and Kasser 2005; Jackson 2009, 37; Lichtenberg 2014, 156). In addition, De Young
(2000, 515–16) demonstrates that pro-environmental and pro-social behaviour are worth
engaging in because of the intrinsic satisfaction they provide. Moving away from materialism
and consumerism may open up opportunities, resources and time to pursue these important
non-material aspects of wellbeing. In turn, the internalisation of values related to personal
growth, close relationships, and contribution to one’s community is likely to instigate a decline
in materialism and a rise in personal wellbeing (Kasser 2002, 99).
Two important points should be noted. First, moving away from materialism and a lifestyle
high in greenhouse gas emissions is not a simple task that can easily be realised by individual
consumers: it is a fundamental social, cultural and economic project, not only requiring
changes in individual values and pursuits, but also a change in the underlying structure of
consumer society and policy interventions at different levels (Jackson 2005, 32–33; 2009,
167).
Second, it should be noted that the strategies mentioned here do not frame environmentally
responsible behaviour in terms of self-sacrifice. The imperative to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions has often been portrayed and perceived as constraining human welfare and threat-
ening our quality of life. However, the apparent trade-off between a healthy environment and a
happy life may make people less likely to behave in pro-environmental ways (Brown and
Kasser 2005, 349–350). To avoid this, the strategies discussed here rather emphasise the
possibility of a ‘double dividend’ of moving away from materialism – that is, reducing
humanity’s environmental impact as well as increasing quality of life (Jackson 2005, 25).
Indeed, Gifford and Comeau (2011) provide empirical evidence confirming that exposure to
motivational-oriented framing (including portrayal of improvements in quality of life resulting
from positive lifestyle-changes, and involvement of solutions, values and visions) is associated
with greater reported competence and climate change engagement than exposure to sacrifice-
oriented messages. Hence, portraying wellbeing and pro-environmental behaviour as compat-
ible pursuits will significantly contribute to tackling moral disengagement and the motivational
gap in climate change by reducing or even completely neutralising the (perceived) conflict
between self-interest and moral standards.
3.3 Addressing Moral Disengagement Directly
The strategies discussed in the previous subsections will help reduce moral disengagement by
reducing the ambiguity or latitude necessary to employ mechanisms of moral disengagement
(section 3.1) and the need thereto (section 3.2). In addition, we would submit that moral
disengagement should be addressed directly, which includes the following three strategies.
First, according to Jamieson (2006, 479), what we need to address climate change is ‘a
sense of ownership and identification with the outcomes that our actions produce,’ which
‘allows us to overcome the alienation from the collective consequences of our actions.’ The
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abundant and pervasive deployment of moral disengagement forms a formidable obstacle to
successfully responding to climate change, because it is precisely such biased reasoning that
enables the alienation from the consequences of one’s conduct.
In Jamieson‘s (2006, 480–1; 2014, 185–93) view, obtaining this sense of ownership and
identification with the outcomes of our actions requires cultivating certain green virtues,
including humility, temperance, mindfulness, cooperativeness, and respect for nature. How-
ever, even appealing to people’s moral character does not form a fail-safe antidote against
moral disengagement, since, as Bandura (2016, 26–27) notes, moral disengagement can
resolve conflicts between virtues and reprehensible conduct as well, by enabling virtuous
individuals to behave in harmful ways but still retain a self-view as virtuous.
We would nonetheless submit that cultivating the particular virtue mindfulness might be
helpful in tackling moral disengagement, because it encourages reflection on the consequences
of one’s actions. In this way, mindfulness may prevent alienation from the outcomes of our
action, and be conducive to gaining the sense of ownership of the outcomes of our actions
Jamieson deems essential for climate change mitigation. When people are mindful, internal
and external realities are perceived openly and without distortion (Brown and Kasser 2005,
351; Jamieson 2006, 480; 2014, 187). Hence, rather than thoughtlessly emitting greenhouse
gases and being morally disengaged from the harmful consequences, mindful people appre-
ciate the proximate as well as remote effects of their actions on the climate (Jamieson 2006,
480; 2014, 187).
Second, a better general understanding of moral psychology and the ability to recognise
mechanisms of moral disengagement by others and oneself may render people less inclined to
deploy such biased reasoning. According to Gardiner (2011a, 301), ‘serious moral agents
strive to protect themselves against rationalization, self-deception, and moral manipulation.’
For people who generally see themselves as moral and honest, and for whom moral integrity is
important, a better understanding of moral disengagement might erode much of the attractive-
ness of the biased reasoning involved. People may be more self-critical and less prone to
deploying moral disengagement if they are aware that it is merely a kind of (self-)deception.
McAlister (2001) indeed found that persuasive communication educating people about moral
disengagement and promoting resistance to it reduces individuals’ tendencies to disengage.
Bustamante and Chaux (2014, 55) were unable to replicate McAlister’s (2001) results regard-
ing persuasive education, but they do provide evidence for the hypothesis that developing
critical thinking enables questioning beliefs or justifications that make it easy for people to
resort to moral disengagement. This research also suggests that if more people become more
critical and less willing to accept their self-justifications, this may create a system of social
regulation, which can be useful for stopping moral disengagement by making the mechanisms
visible to others.
Finally, action on climate change should be linked to positive moral emotions, which might
decrease defensive processing of daunting information about the state of the world, and allow
individuals to recognize tackling climate change in a rewarding rather than discouraging
manner (Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 245). In the previous sections, we already suggested
that communicators should focus on enhancing people’s perceived self-efficacy, rather than on
dire messages about climate change (section 3.1), as well as portray wellbeing and pro-
environmental behaviour as compatible pursuits, rather than using sacrifice-oriented messages
(section 3.2). These strategies are likely to curtail moral disengagement. In addition, feelings of
competence and pride are strong motivators for action (De Young 2000; Williams and DeSteno
2008), and reduce moral disengagement (Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 245).
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4 Conclusion
Selective moral disengagement allows people to engage in conduct that goes against their
moral judgment without having to face moral self-condemnation or social disapproval. In the
context of climate change, moral disengagement allows emitters to continue emitting green-
house gases, rather than having to make fundamental lifestyle changes, while retaining their
self-worth and without feeling accountable for climate-related harms. We indeed illustrated
that at least the strategies of discrediting evidence of harm, advantageous comparison,
diffusion of responsibility, and displacement of responsibility are used in the public discourse
regarding climate change.
These findings are of substantial relevance for climate ethicists, policy-makers,
communicators and environmental psychologists who aim to close the motivational
gap in climate change. For one, these insights contribute to a more comprehensive
understanding of the motivational gap. The climate ethics literature has advanced two
main explanations: on the one hand, it has been argued that our moral judgement
system is not well equipped to identify climate change as an important and urgent
moral issue; and on the other hand, it has been argued that akratic or self-interested
motives to maintain a materialistic lifestyle appear to often gain the upper hand over
moral standards. Moral disengagement connects these explanations: otherwise valid
arguments about the complexity of climate change are misappropriated to exonerate
individual emitters from their accountability for the effects of their profligate emis-
sions. Moreover, the complexity inherent to climate change provides the necessary
latitude for individual emitters to reconstruct the problem of climate change and their
contribution to it by means of moral disengagement, which in turn allows them to
engage in greenhouse gas emitting activities without feeling accountable for the
adverse effects of climate change.
We have argued that on the basis of this comprehensive explanatory framework there
are three groups of strategies that may help tackling moral disengagement and the
motivational gap in climate change. First, the problem of the inherent complexity of
climate change can be tackled by making climate change more salient and personally
relevant for individual emitters, and by increasing their perceived self-efficacy. These
strategies will not only increase people’s motivation to tackle climate change, but also
reduce (the opportunity for) moral disengagement. Second, self-interested motives can be
addressed by reconceptualising wellbeing, away from materialism and towards a direct
focus on quality of life. This move can be motivated by pointing out the negative
consequences of consumerism for personal and collective wellbeing, and the importance
of non-material aspects of human flourishing, both of which contribute to framing
wellbeing and pro-environmental behaviour as compatible pursuits. In this way, they
are likely to contribute to tackling moral disengagement and the motivational gap in
climate change by reducing or neutralising the (perceived) conflict between self-interests
and moral standards. Third, moral disengagement should be addressed directly by
cultivating mindfulness, promoting a better public understanding of moral disengage-
ment, and linking actions on climate change to positive moral emotions.
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